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1
SECOND CAUSE IN POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II. 11
In his commentary on Posterior Analytics II. 11 Ross m a i n t a i n s
that Aristotle substitutes for material cause a n e w cause
representing "necessitating conditions", modeled on the defi n i t i o n
of the syllogism in Prior Analytics I.24bl8-20.
Ross's v i e w is
generally accepted by contemporary translators and commentators.
I contend that the second cause of Posterior Analytics II. 11
expresses Aristotle's doctrine of material cause as hypoth e t i c a l
necessity in Physics II.
Ross insists the second cause is not material cause, b e c a u s e
the notion of constituent material is absent, and Aristotle il l u s 
trates the cause's role as syllogistic middle term through a m a t h e 
matical example. Instead of translating Aristotle's words for the
second cause, "to tinon onton ananke tout· einai·· (94a21-2) , R oss
engages in the following rationale:
"This pretty clearly refers to the definition of syllog i s m as
given in An· Pr. 24bl8-20 and the reference to a syllogism is m a d e
explicit in 94a24-7.
He clearly is referring to the relati o n of
ground to consequent. The ground of the conclusion of a syl l o g i s m
is the two premises taken together, but in order to m a k e h i s
account of this sort of aition fit into his general formula t h a t
the ait ion functions as the middle term in the proof of that w h o s e
aition it is, he represents this aition as being the middle t e r m —
the middle term, we must understand, as related in a certain w a y to
the major and in a certain way to the minor.”
In order to make the words of the first formula mean- "nec e s 
sitating conditions", Ross takes "tinon onton" to be equivalent to
"tëthenton tinon" of the definition of the syllogism [Logos en h o
tethenton tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anankes sumbainei to
tauta einai].
Thus they mean, "When certain things exist", and
stand for syllogistic premises, while the demonstrative t o d i '
stands for the syllogistic conclusion:
"When certain things (the
premises) exist, it is necessary that this thing (the conclusion)
exists." On Ross's interpretation the second cause, signified b y
"tinon onton", then stands for "necessitating conditions" or
"logical ground for a consequent".
However, Aristotle presents two formulations of the s e c o n d
cause in Posterior Analytics II. 11, which he "clearly" mean s to b e
equivalent.
These two formulations of the second cause, t a k e n
literally without reference to the definition of the syllogism, fit
Aristotle's description of a material cause being "hypothetical
necessity" in Physics II - that is, a necessary means to p r o d u c e
a goal.
In Physics II.9 Aristotle's thesis that an e le m e n t a r y
mathematical definition is a "hypothetical necessity" for th e proof
of a mathematical theorem explains the application of the s e c o n d
cause as middle term in the mathematical syllogism of Po s t e r i o r
Analytics II.11.
1. Second Cause in Posterior Analytics II. 11 and Material C ause
in Physics II.
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In Posterior Analytics II.11 Aristotle maintains all four
causes may serve as middle term in a syllogistic demonstration
(94a20ff.)· The first, third and fourth are readily identified as
formal, efficient and final cause; by the process of elimination
the second should be the material cause.
Ross's rendering of
"logical ground of a consequent" or "necessitating conditions" are
highly abstract translations of Aristotle's concrete words for the
second cause.
Although Tredennick says Aristotle's first
formulation, "to tinon onton ananke tout' einai" is "barely repro
ducible in English" , its literal sense would be, "of (for) some
kinds of beings it is a necessity that this thing exist". Here
(without syllogism parallel) "tinon onton" is simply a genitive
noun with adjective, "of some kinds of beings". The demonstrative
"this thing" (tout') names the second cause and "tinoñ onton"
specific beings for which its existence is a necessity.
The immediately following sentence contains a second formu
lation of the second cause which confirms this meaning: 'To hou
ontos todi' ananke einai" (94a24). Literally, "of whose being this
thing is a necessity". This formula is ignored by Ross and commen
tators following his authority, but its meaning is crucial for a
correct understanding of the second cause. In my last section I
shall argue that this second formula undermines Ross's correlation
of the second cause with the definition of the syllogism. For the
present I leave Ross's argument and its philosophical motivations
aside.
In Physics II Aristotle first describes a material cause in
the most familiar way as that out of which a thing is constituted
and which persists in its final form (194b23-5), using familiar
examples such as the bronze of a statue.
However in chapter 7
Aristotle provides another listing of causes in which his descrip
tion of the material cause differs markedly. Since Aristotle uses
the very same example of a syllogism's premises being matter for
its conclusion that he does earlier in chapter 3 (195al8-20) he
evidently sees no conflict between these two descriptions of
material cause.
In listing causes operative in the reproduction of a species
instance, Aristotle describes the material cause in these words:
"that this must be so if that is to be so (as the conclusion
presupposes the premises)" (198b7-8).
Aristotle's Greek is "ei
mellei todi' esesthai." Literally, "If (something) is to come to
pass, this thing will have to be". The Physics II.7 formula for
material cause, like the two formulations of second cause in
APo.II.ll. as I interpret them literally, makes the material cause
a necessity for the existence of something else.
The material
cause is indicated in each by a demonstrative pronoun (todi',
tout) . Although the word "necessity" does not occur in the Phvs.
II.7 definition, the same weight is carried by the verb, esesthai,
"will have to be".
In Parts of Animals 1.1 Aristotle describes hypothetical
necessity in terms similar to the Phvs. II.7 definition of material
cause: "Necessity signifies sometimes that if there is to be that
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for the sake of which, these things must necessarily be present”
(642a32). Here as in the other three cases the cause that is the
hypothetical necessity is signified by a demonstrative, while the
first noun represents the goal it serves.
Thus the second cause of Posterior Analytics II.11 has a
history in Aristotle's doctrine of hypothetical necessity in
Physics II.
Since there is general agreement that the Analytics
were written ca. 341, a few years after Physics II, ca. 347-4,
agreement between the two works is not surprising.
2. Simple and Hypothetical Necessity in Physics II.

»
•

At the close of Physics II Aristotle establishes a connection
between his own material cause and the factor of necessity
prominent in his predecessors' natural science when he identifies
necessity in nature with "matter and its changes" (200a30-32).
Aristotle does not mention "hypothetical necessity" until the last
chapter of Phvs. II.9 (199b34-5), but he already is using the
notion in previous chapters, in particular in the definition of
material cause in Phvs. II.7.
He opens chapter 9 questioning
whether there is both hypothetical and simple necessity in nature.
He defines hypothetical necessity in terms of the necessity of
suitable matter for the fulfillment of an end (200a7-15). But he
is not so explicit about "simple" necessity.
In chapters 7 and 8, however, he has complained that the
ancients (principally Empedocles and Anaxagoras) appealed only to
necessity in accounting for the causes of natural phenomena,
notwithstanding their lip-service to non-material causes such as
mind, love and hate (198bl4-16). Cooper suggests Aristotle objects
only to their overuse of "simple" necessity, and accepts the
presence in nature of "simple" necessity.
In common with his ancient predecessors, Aristotle sees
necessity in the activity of the material elements, fire, earth,
air and water (195al7-18, 198bl2-14)— their transformations into
each other, characteristic alterations and directions of movement.
The four basic material elements act mechanically in heating and
cooling, condensation and rarefaction, etc. Their behavior depends
only on an element's present or antecedent state, and is not
affected by a future state, such as a goal to be realized. Simple
necessity for Aristotle appears to stand for the mechanical
activity of the basic material elements, acting on their own, di
vorced from any purposiveness. When material elements are combined
in the form of a living being, however, their independent activity
is constrained as welj. as utilized by the form's structure and
purposive functioning.
In goal-directed natural processes such as the generation of
a species instance substantial form comprises not only formal and
final cause, but even efficient cause, for "man generates man"
(198a26—7) . The causes of such physical processes are consequently
form, on the one hand, and matter, representing necessity, on the
other (198a24-6). Whenever a sequence of material changes always or
for the most part leads continuously to a distinctive culmination.
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such as the process from acórn to oak, the successive states of
matter are all heneka tou, means toward an ulterior goal, so in
stances of hypothetical necessity in nature (l98a33-5). Since
Aristotle dichotomizes the four causes into matter on the one hand,
and form (containing efficient and final causes) on the other (199a8-ll), each earlier stage of an organism provides the material
conditions (hypothetical necessity) for the next step, until the
form is completely instantiated in a particular individual.
He
defines nature as comprising beings which move continually starting
from a seed produced by an existing adult until the species form of
•that adult is again embodied (199bl5-18).
Necessity in nature includes the presence of the kind of seed
or acorn needed to initiate the generative process (199b7-9). Such
necessity is also hypothetical, required by the presence in nature
of a form destined to be embodied in a new individual, Aristotle
asserts in Physics II.9 (200al9-20) . In an analogy between natural
and craft productions at the beginning of the book *s final chapter,
Aristotle fixes a limited role for matter through its being
hypothetical necessity; the presence of suitable matter, although
required, does not account for the goal that requires and directs
the powers of matter (200a5-15).
3. Mathematical Necessity and Hypothetical Necessity in Physics
II.9.
In Physics II.7 Aristotle opens a discussion of proximate
causes with mathematics, which deals with unmoving things, in
contrast to the moving things of nature. In mathematics the proxi
mate cause is assignable to definitions of elementary notions such
as "right angle” or "Commensurable", while in the case of moving
things, the proximate cause is matter (198al5-18.). Here Aristotle
parallels proximate cause in mathematics (definitions of elementary
notions) with material cause in generated substances.
After describing the role of material cause in natural and
artificial productions as hypothetical necessity, Aristotle makes
a comparison between necessity in nature and in mathematics in
Physics II.9. He illustrates necessity in mathematics by the role
of elementary mathematical definitions in mathematical proof. Is
this necessity hypothetical, or does the def inition "necessitate",
as Ross says?1
Since this is an essential point of my argument, I shall cite
the whole passage together with its prelude.
Here is my
translation of the prelude which connects matter with hypothetical
necessity:
"Similarly, in all other cases in which there is a goal/final
cause, tlyp goal cannot exist without things possessing natural
necessity , but nevertheless the end does not exist on account of
these necessities but for a purpose. For example why is the saw
such a kind of a thing? in order to be this thing and for the sake
of this purpose. However this purpose cannot be fulfilled unless
it is of iron; it is necessary that it be iron, if it is to be a
saw and pérform its proper work. The necessity derives from that
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hypothésis, but is not in the goal.
For necessity is in the
matter, that for the sake of which there is a necessity is in the
account” (200a5-15)
This prelude indicates that a hypothetical necessity, like
that of iron for a saw and acorn for oak, is a necessary means to
a goal, but does not "necessitate" that end: rather, the ground of
the end is "in the account".
If the elementary mathematical
definition is also a hypothetical necessity for the goal of the
theorem*s proof, the elementary definition does not account for or
"necessitate" a mathematical theorem it goes to prove.
The
following passage indicates the elementary mathematical definition
is such a hypothetical necessity:
"The necessity in mathematics and genesis in accordance with
nature are in a certain way comparable.
For since the straight
line is this particular thing, it is necessary that the triangle
has angles equal to two right angles. But it is not the case that
because the latter (the triangle has angles equal to two right
angles), the former (the definition of straight line). However, if
the theorem is not, neither is the definition of straight line. In
generation for the sake of an end, it is the other way round, if
the end will be or is, also that which precedes it will be or is.
If not, just as there not being the conclusion, the starting point
will not be, so is it here with the end and purpose...so that if
there is a house, it is necessary for certain things to become or
already exist, or generally the matter that is means for the end,
for example, brick or stone, if a house. Not however on account of
these things (brick and stone) is there the end, except as its
matter; neither will the end exist on account of the means (brick
and stone). Generally however if the means do not exist neither
will there be house or saw, in the one case there not being stones,
in the other no iron.
Neither here (in mathematics) are there
starting points (elementary definitions) if the triangle does not
have two right angles" (200al5-30).
In the latter part of the passage (200a25-30) Aristotle
parallels elementary mathematical definitions (archai) with the
necessary material means of stones for a house and iron for a saw.
As in the prelude Aristotle asserts these means are necessary for
but do not necessitate the ends they make possible. He adds at the
end that the absence of an end or the falsity of a mathematical
theorem implies that its necessary means do not exist.
If a
mathematical theorem is false, then the necessary starting point
for its proof, the definition of a suitable elementary mathematical
notion, is not available. Consequently for Aristotle, the starting
points for mathematical proof are elementary mathematical
definitions such as those for straight line, right angle and
commensurable — they constitute hypothetical necessity for the
truth of a theorem, comparable to stones for a house and iron for
a saw.
If Aristotle considers the elementary mathematical definition
a hypothetical necessity in mathematical proof, what is the meaning
of "since the straight line is this particular thing, it is neces-
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sary that the triangle has angles equal to two right angles”
(200al7-18)? It cannot mean that the definition of straight line
by itself necessitates the truth of the theorem. Like the stones
of the house or the iron of the saw, the definition is only a
necessity for the. theorem*s truth, one premise of the mathematical
syllogism that constitutes its demonstration. Aristotle clarifies
this point in APo.II.11, when he remarks that a second premise is
needed to produce a conclusion even when the middle term is a cause
that is a necessity for it (94a24-26) . The requirement of a second
premise shows the definitional premise alone does not necessitate
the„conclusion.
After pointing out the similarity between necessity in nature
and mathematics in that their goals involve hypothetical necessity,
the early part of the passage goes on to point out a difference.
In mathématics priority lies in the starting points and necessary
means, the elementary definitions.
Their truth does not depend
upon theorems for which they are hypothetical necessity; the
theorem does not substantiate the elementary notion (200al8). In
their
independence elementary mathematical
definitions are
comparable,to material elements, like them having their own "natu
ral necessity”, apart from higher level beings they compose. In
natural, generation the case is "the other way round" : the adult
form ofl oak generates its own material starting point, the acorn,
and "men generates man". Thus the goal of natural genesis, unlike
the theorem of mathematics, brings into existence its own material
starting point, showing the primacy of form over matter/necessity
in nature.
Ross misses the point that an elementary mathematical defini
tion is hypothetical necessity for a theorem's proof, like th^
necessary material means in the genesis of a species instance.
He sees only a comparison between mathematical and natural
necessity in each being "one-sided":
the elementary definition
necessitating the theorem, but not vice-versa; the adult form
necessitating the material means, but not vice-versa. If, however,
the mathematical definition necessitated the theorem, instead of
being a necessity for its proof, it would make no sense for
Aristotle to sandwich his talk of mathematical necessity between
discussions of hypothetical necessity, as he does, and to parallel
elementary mathematical notions with necessary material means.
Aristotle*s final point stresses a second resemblance between
necessity in mathematics and necessity in natural or artificial
production, which reinforces thé parallel between elementary
mathematica1 notions and material means.
If the mathematical
theorem about the triangle *s angle sum has no proof, then there is
not the elementary definition (of straight line) necessary to its
proof.
This conditional foreshadows the latter passage in which
the nonexistence of house or saw and falsity of goal/theorem are
attributed to the absence of each^ne's hypothetical necessity,
material means or starting points.
Aristotle*s point that the
failure of a goal to be realized implies that its necessary means
do not exist stresses again the role of hypothetical necessity as
means necessary for an end.

7

?
fc

4. Hypothetical Necessity and Material Cause in Posterior Analytics
11.11.
Aristotle*s illustration of hypothetical necessity by an
elementary mathematical definition in Phvs. II.9 is the key to the
mathematical illustration of the second cause in APo. II.11. In
the latter, the definition of right angle illustrates the second
cause, which he names middle term in a syllogism whose conclusion
is that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle. He
names the terms as follows;
Major term A - right angle; middle term B = half of two right
angles; minor term C = angle in the semicircle.
The crucial passage, which Ross ignores and does not trans
late, comes in the question, "of what being is the right angle?”
(94a28). This question signals the definition of a right angle:
"half of two right angles".
Thus the mathematical syllogism goes
in Aristotle's terms:
B =. A (elementary definition of right angle); C = B; there
fore, C = A.
The minor premise needed to complete the syllogism, that the
angle in a semicircle is equal to half of two right angles, is
derived from prior mathematical reasoning and probably exhibited in
a diagram (Met. 1051a23-9).
In the earlier mathematical example of Phvs. II.9 Aristotle
does not formulate the mathematical syllogism or name its terms as
he does in APo. II.11, but he refers to a syllogistic conclusion
(199b21) (that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles) and
refers to the definition of straight line without giving it. Ross
explains that the definition of straight line in luciid implies the
property of having angles equal ty5 two right angles when "one
straight line stands on another." .
One can reconstruct the
syllogism, inserting the two premises, in analogy with that of APo.
11.11, as follows:
Major term A = equal to two right angles; middle term B =
straight line's angle sum; minor term Ç = angle sum of a triangle?
The mathematical syllogism goes
B = A (elementary definition of straight line), C - B; there^
fore, C = A.
Again the other premise that a triangle's angles are equal to
those around a straight line is derived from prior mathematical
reasoning and/or exhibited in a diagram·
Thus the causal middle term of APo. II. 11 and the hypothetical
necessity of Phvs. II.9, both elementary mathematical definitions,
play an identical role as middle term in syllogistic proof of a
mathematical theorem.
The two mathematical passages complement
each other in explaining the necessary role of the definition of an
elementary mathematical notion in the syllogism that constitutes
demonstration of a mathematical theorem.
One must note the
significance of Aristotle's question, "Of what being is a right
angle?" in APo. II.11, in order to connect the second cause of APo.
II.11 with the elementary mathematical definition being proximate
cause in Phvs. 11,7 and hypothetical necessity in the mathematical
syllogism of Phvs. II.9.
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At the end of the mathematical demonstration in APo II.ll
Aristotle says baldly "and this thing (the second cause) is the
same as the formal cause (To ti en einai)" (94b34), an identifi
cation troubling to many. Tredennick, following Ross, maintains
the material cause "inappropriate for the present purpose", a
mathematical demonstration, and protests "the material cause cannot
be equated with the formal cause".
Since Aristotle speaks of an
elementary mathematical definition as "ti esti" cause (Phvs.
198al6-18) one can understand how he thinks of it also as a formal
cause, even though its being hypothetical necessity associates it
with material cause.
Although Aristotle’s claim that elementary mathematical
definitions correspond to material cause seems bizarre. Metaphysics
K raises the issue of what science handles difficulties about the
matter of the objects of mathematics (1059bl5ff). Since straight
line and right angle, for example, are necessary components of a
geometrical figure, much as bricks are components of a house, they
may correspond to material cause. The final sentences in Phvs.II.
9 speak of a factor of necessity in a definition such that some
parts are like the "matter in the definition" (200b4-8) . Thus a
unity of formal and material cause in mathematical demonstration is
not far-fetched for Aristotle.
Aristotle concludes APo. II.11 with a discussion of simple
necessity, first asserting the possible coincidence of necessity
and final cause as dual explanations of the same thing (94b27-37).
Here?the identity of the factor of necessity with Aristotle’s more
familiar material cause is undeniable: In Phvs. II.3 (195al7-18)
fire and the other material elements are cited as instances of
material cause; similarly in APo. II.11 he illustrates necessity
through phenomena of the basic material elements.
Necessity ac
counts for the firelight emanating from the pores of the lantern
(material cause), which thereby lights the traveler's path (final
cause); the occurrence of thunder produced by the extinction of
fire in the clouds (material cause) serves to frighten sinners in
Tartarus on the Pythagorean view (final cause).
He makes a new distinction between the simple necessity of
Phvs. II, in which a thing acts in accords with its natural
impulse, and a necessity which compels a thing to act contrary to
it, as when a stone is thrown upward (94b37-95a2). He alludes to
Phvs. Il*s subordination of hypothetical necessity to formal/final
cause in his insistence that works of mind such as a house or
statue only come into being through a final cause never merely
through (simple) necessity. Far from being absent from the chap
ter, Aristotle's classic material cause appears in the guise of
necessity, both simple and hypothetical.
5.Ross's Rejection of Material Cause in Posterior Analytics II.11.
I shall complete my argument by questioning Ross's derivation
of "necessitating conditions" for the second cause via the defini
tion of the syllogism.
The definition of the syllogism is a
complex grammatical statement of 15 words, "Logos en ho tethenton
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complex grammatical statement of 15 words, "Logos en ho tethenton
tinon heteron ti ton keimenon ex anankes sumbainei to taut a einai".
("A syllogism is a form of words in which when certain assumptions
are made, something other than what has been assumed necessarily
follows from the fact that the assumptions are such”).
The
second cause is described in two short phrases.
The first, the
only one noted by Ross, reads, "To tinon onton ananke tout* einai".
Ross's translation depends on paralleling this phrase with the
definition of the syllogism to make tinon onton into a genitive
absolute so that it means "When certain things exist". The text
itself does not make any such parallel.
Aristotle's second
formulation of the second cause in the immediately following
sentence, however, bears no resemblance to the definition of the
syllogism except for one common word "necessity".
Ross neglects
these words: nhou ontos todi* ananke einai" (94a24). But this
second formulation ought to be considered when the meaning of the
second cause is in question, for clearly Aristotle supposes his two
formulations of the second cause are equivalent.
If the second
does not mean "necessitating conditions", neither does the first.
In the second formula the genitive plural "tinon onton", which
Ross identifies with syllogistic premises, is replaced by the
singular "hou ontos", a genitive noun and possessive, "the being of
which".
This switch undermines Ross's interpretation, for one
cannot turn the latter into "when certain things exist" for a
syllogistic parallel by any grammatical stratagem. Ross requires
a plural to correspond to the syllogism's two "necessitating"
premises, whereas the second formula only contains two singulars,
one for the necessity and one for that of which it is necessity.
Aristotle's indifferent use of singular or plural for the
first noun of the second cause formula is readily explained if the
genitive noun indicates a kind of thing for which the second cause,
the demonstrative, is a necessity. A literal translation of the
second formula, "for whose being this thing is a necessity",
implies the cause is Aristotle's "hypothetical necessity", a
necessary means to a goal named by the first noun.
The whole
sentence containing the second description of the second cause
holds that this kind of cause cannot be inferred from one premise
only. Ross translates: "For... the conditions that necessitate a
consequent must be at least two, linked by a single middle term."
Aristotle's own words contain no plural for Ross's "conditions that
necessitate a consequent". If one translates literally, the sen
tence says, "that of whose being this thing is a necessity, there
is no (conclusion) taking one premise only, two are the least
number; this is the case whenever they have one middle term"
(94a24-26).
Ross supposes Aristotle's reference here to the syllogism con
firms his linking of the second cause with the definition of the
syllogism. Aristotle's cautionary remark is apt, however, when a
material cause/hypothetical necessity is middle term.
For we
readily leap between the presence of a thing and its necessary
means - syllable and letters;
saw and iron, etc.
In contrast
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efficient cause and final cause are usually separable from what
they effect.
By underlining the necessity of a second premise,
Aristotle implies that the second cause by itself does not
necessitate the syllogistic conclusion,.pace Ross.
Ross's application of the second cause standing for an
"eternal ground" in Aristotle's mathematical example is not a
success even in his own eyes.
He first says it can be understood
from Meta. 104la27-30 and Meta.1051a27. The former stresses that
the formal cause (to ti en einai) is the prime explanation for an
attribute belonging to a subject. In the latter Aristotle explains
that the proof of a mathëmatical theorem, mentioning the very two
used as examples in Ago. II. 11 and Phvs. II.9, is apparent to one
who perceives how it iá exhibited in a geometrical construction.
Ross does not connect these passages with the "¿terna1 ground" he
supposes to operate in Aristotle's mathematical example.
Ross argues that in any syllogism a middle term, whatever its
referent, necessitates the conclusion because of its logical
relationship with end terms established in the two premises.
However the second cause middle term, because of its actual
referent, enables one to recognize how it necessitates the conclu
sion. Although Ross surmises that Aristotle substitutes "eternal
ground" because a matèrial cause cannot be employed as middle term
in a mathematical syllogism, he expresses dissatisfaction with its
mathematical illustration in Ago II.11:
"In this argument NQP's being the half of two right angles is
the ground of its being one right angle, or rather the causa
coqnoscendi of this...But Aristotle's comment 'this, the ground, is
the same as the essencë of thé attribute demonstrated, because this
is what its definition points to' (a34-5j is a puzzling statement.
Reasoning by analogy (it would appear)...A. seems to contemplate
some such definition of the rightness of the angle in the
semicircle as 'its being right in consequence of being the half of
two right a n g l e s a n d for this little can be said. The analogy
between the efficient cause of an event and the causa coqnoscendi
of an eternal consequent breaks down; the one can fairly be
included in the definition of the event, the other cannot be
included in the definition of the consequent."
Barnes rejects Ross's epistemological version of the second
cause which makes it the caus^ of our knowing that the middle term
necessitates the conclusion.
Instead Barnes concedes that the
second cause is an "uncanohic" form of material cause, whose
material content somehow necessitates the conclusion. Both Barnes
and Ross overlook Aristotle's caveat that the second cause like any
other middle term, requires a second premise in order to generate
a conclusion. If the second cause middle term of itself necessi
tated the conclusion, there would be no need for a second premise
or a syllogism.
In Ross's analysis the "consequent" is the conclusion that the
angle in the semicircle is a right angle, while its "eternal
ground" is Aristotle^s middle term B, half of two right angles.
Ross's application of Aristotle's words about the second cause
being the same as the formal cause runs into trouble because he
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supposes them to mean that the "eternal ground”, half of two right
angles" is an element of the "consequent", the whole conclusion
that the angle in the semicircle is right.
Ross's analysis is
faulty: 2Q What Aristotle does, following Euclid as Ross duly
reports,20 is to define the right angle itself as half of two right
angles.
This is an elementary mathematical definition, which
serves as hypothetical necessity according to Phvs. II.9, and is
one premise of the mathematical syllogism.
This definition of
right angle shows that the angle in the semicircle is right,
because the angle in the semicircle is half of two right angles, as
the accompanying geometrical construction would show, and as the
second premise holds.
The inability of Ross to explain how Aristotle's mathematical
illustration works out proves the bankruptcy of his view that the
second cause represents "necessitating conditions" or "eternal
ground of a consequent", or the cause of our knowing such. On the
other hand, if the second cause of APo. II.11 is the hypothetical
necessity of Physics II.9, both works are coherent in showing the
mathematical application of Aristotle's definition of material
cause in Physics II.7. It is not surprising Aristotle emphasizes
the factor of necessity rather than material constituent in his
descriptions of the second cause in APo. II.11, since its greater
inclusiveness covers demonstrations of mathematics as well as
physics.
The novelty of Aristotle's actual words for the second cause
is not the only reason for Ross's rejection of material cause in
APo. II.11.
Ross promulgates the thesis that matter, being a
metaphysical notion, unknowable in itself, plays no part in thé
Analytics.
Defending the view that Aristotle "is not putting
forward his usual four causes", Ross speculates "this chapter
belongs to an early stage at which he had not reached the doctrine
of the four causes." Yet there is common agreement among scholars
that Physics II, where Aristotle presents a full exposition of the
four causes, was completed several years before Aristotle undertook
the Analytics.
Among all the works of Aristotle Rist claims
Analytics virtually the only one written consecutively from
beginning to end, so we cannot simpóse the Posterior Analytics
chapter written before Physics II.
Ross's second ground for denying the presence of material
cause is the questionable metaphysical status of matter: "...both
the word hyle and the notion for which it stands are entirely
absent from the Organon. It could hardly be Otherwise; hyle is
agnostos kath'auten (Met. 1036a9); it does not occur as a term in
any of our ordinary judgments (as apart from metaphysical
judgments) and it is with judgments and the inferences that include
them that logic is concerned."
However, the bewildering metaphysical conception of matter
treated in Metaphysics differs from the common-sensical notion of
a material cause, which Aristotle maintains the science of physics
must study in Physics II. The ancient commentators had no trouble
identifying the second cause with Aristotle's material cause.
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Ross does not point to any other place where Aristotle invokes the
syllogistic-type cause. It is unlikely Aristotle would introduce
a remarkable new cause, then drop it entirely.
In contrast the
notion of hypothetical necessity is a fundamental principle of
Aristotle's biology. I conclude that Aristotle's second cause in
APo. II. 11 expresses Aristotle's material cause/hypothetical neces
sity,
not some "uncanonical" material cause, "eternal ground",
."logical ground of a conseguent" or "necessitating conditions".
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